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ESSAY
THE LIVING ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
Daniel J. Hemel*
In the coming months, the Internal Revenue Service is likely to issue
a slew of new regulations interpreting the December 2017 federal tax
reform legislation. These regulations are likely to define the scope of the
new deduction for pass-through entities; determine the reach of the new
base erosion tax on multinational enterprises; fill in the details of the
new “opportunity zone” program aimed at encouraging investment in
low-income communities; and address a wide range of other important
matters.1 Inevitably, some taxpayers will object to these regulations and
will seek to challenge the new rules in court. When, where, and how
they can do so will depend upon the way courts construe the 150-yearold Anti-Injunction Act (AIA).
For decades, individuals and entities wishing to contest their tax
liabilities have had a choice among three paths: (1) file a prepayment
petition in the U.S. Tax Court; (2) pay the tax and then sue for a refund
in federal district court; or (3) pay the tax and then sue for a refund in
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. For helpful comments,
the author thanks Ellen Aprill, Wei Cui, Cliff Flemming, Andy Grewal, Kristin Hickman,
Aaron Nielson, and Jacob Ruby. All errors are my own.
1
See An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent
Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–97, § 11011 (2017)
(deduction for qualified business income of pass-thru entities); id. § 13823 (opportunity
zones); id. § 14401 (base erosion minimum tax); see also David J. Kautter & William M.
Paul, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 2017–2018 Priority Guidance Plan (Second Quarter
Update) (Feb. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/FZF9-55LB (listing in Part 1 of the plan some of
these and several other goals as “near term priorities” for the “initial implementation” of the
2017 tax law”).
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the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.2 What they could not do is seek an
injunction preventing the Internal Revenue Service from assessing or
collecting the tax in question. Standing in their way would be the AIA,
which provides, in relevant part, that “no suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in
any court by any person.”3
All that is now in doubt. In 2016, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
sued the IRS in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas,
seeking to set aside a Treasury tax regulation4 that determines the
circumstances under which a domestic entity that switches its legal
domicile to a foreign country becomes subject to a special tax.5 The IRS
argued that the AIA clearly barred the chamber’s action. In a decision
that surprised many observers (including me6), the district court said last
fall that the AIA presented no barrier to the chamber’s claim for
equitable relief. According to the court, the regulation “is not a tax,” but
instead “determin[es] who is subject to taxation.”7 The court then
proceeded to the merits and agreed with the chamber that the regulation
should be set aside.
As far as judicial decisions on matters of tax procedure go, this one
was a bombshell. A headline in the trade publication Tax Notes
announced that the ruling “throws [the] door open” to more challenges
to IRS rules.8 Tax scholar Andy Grewal noted that the district court’s
decision “breaks from the common (though not necessarily correct)
understanding” of the AIA.9 Fellow tax scholar Bryan Camp went one
step further and argued that the decision was not only a departure from
precedent but also a clear misinterpretation of the AIA. In his view,
2

See, e.g., Joseph Bankman et al., Federal Income Taxation 42 (17th ed. 2017).
I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012).
4
The IRS is an agency within the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and courts commonly
refer to regulations published by the IRS as “Treasury regulations.” See, e.g., PPL Corp. v.
Comm’r, 569 U.S. 329, 331 (2013).
5
Chamber of Commerce v. IRS, No. 1:16–CV–944–LY, 2017 WL 4682050, at *1 (W.D.
Tex. Sept. 29, 2017).
6
Daniel Hemel, The Chamber of Commerce Has an Anti-Injunction Problem, Yale J. on
Reg.: Notice & Comment (Aug. 6, 2016), https://perma.cc/KU4S-4GPL.
7
Chamber of Commerce, 2017 WL 4682050, at *3.
8
Andrew Velarde, Chamber of Commerce Throws Door Open for More Reg Challenges,
Tax Notes (Oct. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/WW73-AFE8.
9
Andy Grewal, Loss in Anti-Inversion Case Strikes Potentially Major Blow on IRS’s
Rulemaking Authority, Yale J. on Reg.: Notice & Comment (Sept. 30, 2017),
https://perma.cc/V5CF-M6PE.
3
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“[t]his is exactly the kind of suit that the Anti-Injunction Act is supposed
to stop.”10 The IRS has appealed from the district court’s ruling to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.11
With the fate of the AIA hanging in the balance, now is the perfect
moment for a thoughtful and thorough treatment of the statute that traces
the law’s evolution from its origins to the present day. And in Restoring
the Lost Anti-Injunction Act, Professor Kristin Hickman and Gerald
Kerska provide exactly that.12 Indeed, their new article on the AIA is
quite possibly the most comprehensive analysis of the Act ever written.
“Timing matters,” Hickman and Kerska write in their opening
sentence,13 and while the authors are referring to the timing of judicial
review, their own timing is impeccable.
Hickman and Kerska’s analysis also provides a thought-provoking
counterweight to the conventional wisdom that Chamber of Commerce
v. IRS marks a sharp break from the past. The narrow interpretation of
the AIA adopted by the district court in the Chamber of Commerce case
is, in their view, largely consistent with the “lost” history of the Act.14
According to Hickman and Kerska, the AIA historically applied only
after a taxpayer filed a return and federal tax officials began their
assessment and collection efforts. Pre-enforcement judicial review of a
tax regulation would, on this reading, fall outside the statute’s scope.15
Whether or not one ultimately agrees with Hickman and Kerska’s
conclusion, their article is likely to become the jumping-off point for
future debates about the AIA. I, for one, was impressed by Hickman and
Kerska’s historical and doctrinal heavy lifting but was unpersuaded by
their bottom line. This essay briefly summarizes Hickman and Kerska’s
case for a narrower reading of the AIA and then responds with three
criticisms of the authors’ argument. Specifically, I argue (1) that the
history of the AIA is at best inconclusive as to whether the statute
should be construed broadly or narrowly; (2) that developments in
federal tax and administrative law since 1867 do not weigh decisively in
10

Bryan Camp, More on the Successful Challenge to the Anti-inversion Regulations,
Procedurally Taxing (Oct. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/T9SV-PFJF.
11
Notice of Appeal, Chamber of Commerce v. IRS, No. 17–51063 (5th Cir. filed Nov. 27,
2017), ECF No. 1.
12
Kristin E. Hickman & Gerald Kerska, Restoring the Lost Anti-Injunction Act, 103 Va.
L. Rev. 1683 (2017), https://perma.cc/SJX3-FDLV.
13
Id. at 1684.
14
Id. at 1687, 1766.
15
Id. at 1753–56.
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favor of a narrow interpretation of the statute; and (3) that the AIA has
come to play an important role—unacknowledged in Hickman and
Kerska’s otherwise comprehensive analysis—in protecting an underresourced IRS from an onslaught of administrative law challenges across
a wide range of litigation forums. I end by arguing that any further
narrowing of the AIA should be done by Congress—not by the courts—
and should be accompanied by an increase in IRS resources and
additional limits on taxpayer forum shopping.
I. LOST AND FOUND?
Hickman and Kerska begin their argument for a narrower AIA with a
deep dive into the statute’s history. As they write, “historical analysis
provides a powerful tool for resolving the AIA’s meaning and scope.”16
Yet this “powerful tool” turns out to be a double-edged sword: the
lessons that the authors draw from the AIA’s history can be deployed to
argue for either a narrow or expansive reading of the statute.
The story starts with the Revenue Act of 1862,17 the first federal
income tax law to take effect.18 As Hickman and Kerska explain, this
statute—enacted in the midst of the Civil War—empowered the
President to divide the country into districts and to appoint “assessors”
and “collectors” to administer the new tax law in each district.19 The job
of the assessors and their assistants was to receive returns, conduct
investigations to determine whether taxpayers had understated their
liability, publish tentative assessments, resolve appeals, and then make
out a list of amounts due. Section 19 of the Revenue Act of 1862
instructed collectors to publish those lists and, if need be, seize and sell
the property of tax delinquents.20
The AIA enters the narrative a half decade in. Styled as an
amendment to be appended to Section 19, it provided (in language that
has changed little in the years since) that “no suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of tax shall be maintained in any
16

Id. at 1721.
Ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432.
18
Hickman & Kerska, supra note 12, at 1721–22. Congress included an income tax in the
Revenue Act of 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309, but that statute never took effect. See
Sheldon D. Pollack, The First National Income Tax, 1861–1872, 67 Tax Law. 311, 320–21
(2014).
19
Hickman & Kerska, supra note 12, at 1722.
20
Id. at 1723–24; see Revenue Act of 1862 § 19.
17
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court.”21 Neither the sponsor of the amendment, Senator William
Fessenden of Maine, nor any other member of the House or Senate said
anything on the record about the provision’s purpose, leading one later
commentator to conclude that the Act’s “legislative history is shrouded
in darkness.”22 But according to Hickman and Kerska, “Congress did not
need to be more specific about the AIA’s scope because the meaning of
the new restriction on judicial review was obvious from its statutory
context.”23 As they see it, the location of the new language at the end of
Section 19 meant that the AIA was intended as “a limited remedy for
judicial obstruction” of the “particular procedures” for assessment and
collection prescribed by that Section.24
In the century and a half since the statute’s passage, Congress has
carved out a number of specific exceptions to the AIA’s coverage. A
few of those carve-outs now allow for prepayment petitions in Tax
Court;25 innocent spouse relief;26 and injunctions in cases where a
taxpayer seeks a hearing before the IRS seizes her property27a preparer
seeks to delay collection of penalties against her,28 or a person other than
a delinquent taxpayer seeks to block the sale of property in which she
holds an interest.29 As Hickman and Kerska observe, “the only
amendments to the AIA have come when Congress wanted to expand
the availability of judicial review and, correspondingly, to make clear
Congress’s intention to limit the AIA’s reach.”30 The authors appear to
interpret this as an indication that Congress favors a narrower AIA.
Three further developments play an important role in Hickman and
Kerska’s narrative. The first involves the Tax Injunction Act of 1937
(TIA), which provides that federal district courts “shall not enjoin,
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the
courts of such State.”31 In the 2015 case Direct Marketing Association v.
21

Revenue Act of 1867, ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 471, 475.
Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes Despite Statutory
Prohibition, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 109, 109 & n.9 (1935).
23
Hickman & Kerska, supra note 12, at 1725.
24
Id.
25
I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2012).
26
Id. § 6015(e).
27
Id. § 6330(e)(1).
28
Id. § 6694(c).
29
Id. § 7426(a) & (b)(1).
30
Hickman & Kerska, supra note 12, at 1731.
31
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
22
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Brohl, the Supreme Court held that the TIA does not prevent a federal
court from enjoining a Colorado law requiring out-of-state retailers to
share certain tax-related information with Colorado tax authorities.32 The
Supreme Court also said that it “assume[d] that words in both [the AntiInjunction and Tax Injunction] Acts are generally used in the same way”
and so would interpret the two statutes in tandem.33 According to
Hickman and Kerska, “the reasoning of Direct Marketing is different
from and difficult to square with at least some of the Court’s past AIA
precedents.”34 A more circumscribed construction of the Anti-Injunction
Act would “bring[] the AIA in alignment” with the post-Direct
Marketing TIA.35
Second, Hickman and Kerska note that the Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946 (APA) and the Supreme Court cases construing it have
established a general presumption in favor of pre-enforcement judicial
review of final agency action.36 As the Supreme Court said in Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, “judicial review of a final agency action by an
aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to
believe that such was the purpose of Congress.”37 Interpreting the AIA
to preclude pre-enforcement review of Treasury regulations puts it in
some tension with the APA’s presumption of reviewability. Hickman
and Kerska seek to ease that tension with a narrower reading of the
AIA.38
Third, the authors emphasize that the federal tax laws do much more
today than they used to do.39 Important antipoverty programs, such as
the Earned Income Tax Credit40 and the Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit,41are run through the Internal Revenue Code. Congress also uses
the tax system to subsidize—and to regulate—health insurance,
retirement saving, higher education, and charitable giving, among
countless other tax expenditures. Hickman and Kerska fear that a robust

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

135 S. Ct. 1124, 1127 (2015).
See id. at 1129.
Hickman & Kerska, supra note 12, at 1711.
Id. at 1757.
Id. at 1684–85; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012).
387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
Hickman & Kerska, supra note 12, at 1757.
Id. at 1713, 1717–20.
I.R.C. § 32 (2012).
Id. § 42.
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application of the AIA will thus interfere with judicial oversight over a
wide swath of the modern administrative state.
Drawing from the “lost history” of the AIA as well as these more
recent developments, Hickman and Kerska propose a new “engagement
test” that would “limit the AIA’s scope to those cases in which the IRS
has initiated enforcement proceedings of one manner or another against
a particular taxpayer” or the taxpayer has filed a return.42According to
Hickman and Kerska, this new test would restore the Anti-Injunction
Act to its “original scope” and harmonize it with the Tax Injunction Act
and Administrative Procedure Act.43 And they add that the test would be
“very easy” to apply in the “vast majority” of cases, thus bringing clarity
to what is now a morass of conflicting case law.44 While they suggest
that courts can adopt the test on their own, Hickman and Kerska also
urge Congress to codify their new engagement test, and they propose
legislative language to that effect.45
II. ASSESSING THE ENGAGEMENT TEST
Hickman and Kerska’s “engagement test” has undeniable appeal. It
provides a plausible interpretation of the AIA’s text, and by narrowing
the statute’s scope, the test would ease the discomfort that many
(including me) feel when legitimate challenges to Treasury regulations
are tossed aside on jurisdictional grounds. And apart from the merits of
the test, there is much to admire about the enterprise in which Hickman
and Kerska engage. This is the sort of “practical” legal scholarship that
jurists such as Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit have urged
academics to produce more often.46 Hickman and Kerska’s article
accomplishes exactly what Judge Edwards said that practical scholarship
should do: it “gives due weight to cases, statutes and other authoritative
texts, but also employs theory to criticize doctrine, to resolve problems
that doctrine leaves open, and to propose changes in the law.”47 Their
careful and powerful argument is likely to elicit attention from judges
and their clerks who come across AIA cases on their dockets.
42

Hickman & Kerska, supra note 12, at 1754.
Id. at 1756–57.
44
Id. at 1758.
45
Id.
46
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 35 (1992).
47
Id.
43
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Yet Hickman and Kerska’s inferences from the AIA’s history are also
open to question. As the authors note, “[i]n 1867, when the AIA was
adopted, the only circumstances in which a taxpayer might have sought
injunctive relief from assessment or collection would have occurred
when revenue officials acted to enforce the tax laws against particular
taxpayers.”48 Nearly eight decades before the APA and a full century
before Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, the notion that the 1867 law
later would preclude pre-enforcement challenges to Treasury regulations
would have seemed foreign to the Reconstruction-era Congress.
But if members of Congress in 1867 could have peered far into the
future, it is not clear whether they would have wanted the AIA to apply
to pre-enforcement judicial review of Treasury regulations. In Hickman
and Kerska’s view, Congress wanted the statute to apply only to
injunctions against assessors and collectors who were enforcing the tax
laws against particular taxpayers. Hickman and Kerska also note,
though, that the statute originally “forced aggrieved taxpayers to pay
their taxes as assessed and sue the government for a refund” rather than
pursue alternative remedial paths.49 The alternative of a pre-enforcement
challenge to a Treasury regulation was not one that existed at the time,
but if it had, perhaps Congress would have wished to cut that route off
too. In other words, we know that Congress wanted aggrieved taxpayers
to sue for a refund rather than to seek injunctive relief against assessors
and collectors, but that tells us little about whether Congress wanted to
allow other end runs around the refund remedy.
The postenactment legislative history of the AIA also is amenable to
competing inferences. On the one hand, the fact that Congress has
narrowed the statute’s scope again and again might suggest that it
disfavors an expansive reading. On the other hand, Congress clearly
knows how to cut back on the AIA when it wants to, and the fact that it
has stood by as courts have construed the statute expansively might
suggest that Congress acquiesces to the broader interpretation. In all
likelihood, very few members of Congress in the past century and a half
have arrived at any opinion whatsoever as to whether the AIA should
preclude pre-enforcement judicial review of Treasury regulations. The
fact that Congress has carved out a number of other exceptions to the

48
49

Hickman & Kerska, supra note 12, at 1751.
Id. at 1725.
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AIA does not mean that the legislative branch favors the particular
narrowing that Hickman and Kerska propose.
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the TIA in Direct Marketing
Association v. Brohl also does not yield clear lessons with respect to preenforcement judicial review and the AIA. The similar language in the
two statutes—”restrain[] the assessment . . . or collection of any tax”50—
demands some limiting principle; otherwise, a suit to stop the
construction of a state highway could be barred by the AIA or TIA
because it interferes with the ability of tax authorities to travel around
and do their jobs. The Court in Direct Marketing concluded that the
Colorado law, which required retailers to share tax-related information
with the state but did not impose any tax on them, was too attenuated
from “assessment” and “collection” for it to fall within the TIA’s
protection.51 But that does not tell us whether an order that sets aside a
regulation determining actual tax liabilities operates as a “restrain[t]” on
assessment and collection.
The rise of pre-enforcement judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act fails to illuminate the Anti-Injunction Act’s scope any
further. Hickman and Kerska write that “Congress, in Section 559 of the
APA, expressly instructed courts to read the APA and specific statutes
like the AIA so as to give maximum effect to both.”52 But that is plainly
not what the APA mandates. Section 559 says that the provisions of the
APA “do not limit or repeal additional requirements imposed by
statute.”53 The AIA is one such additional requirement, instructing
taxpayers as to when and where they can seek relief. Section 559 goes
on to say that any “[s]ubsequent statute may not be held to supersede or
modify [the APA], except to the extent that it does so expressly,”54 but
the Anti-Injunction Act, which precedes the Administrative Procedure
Act by nearly eighty years, is not a “subsequent statute.”
The octopus-like extension of federal tax law’s tentacles into new
areas of American life likewise tells us little about the AIA’s reach. To
be sure, Congress circa 1867 could not have imagined that programs like
the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
50
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); see also I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012) (“restraining the assessment
or collection of any tax”).
51
Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1131 (2015).
52
Hickman & Kerska, supra note 12, at 1756–57.
53
5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012) (emphasis added).
54
Id. (emphasis added).
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would be run through the Internal Revenue Code. But members of
Congress most certainly did know about the existence of the AIA when
they first enacted the Earned Income Tax Credit in 197555 and the LowIncome Housing Tax Credit in 1986.56 There are many reasons why
lawmakers might have chosen to place these provisions in Title 26 and
to assign administrative responsibility to the IRS, but the fact that the
AIA would shield regulations under these provisions from preenforcement judicial review might have been one attraction. At the very
least, if one believes that Congress carefully placed the AIA where it did
in 1867 so as to send a signal regarding the provision’s scope, it
becomes difficult to argue that Congress scattered other provisions
throughout the Internal Revenue Code by sheer accident or
happenstance.
None of this is to suggest that the inferences drawn above from the
Anti-Injunction Act’s history, the Supreme Court’s Tax Injunction Act
case law, and subsequent developments in federal administrative and tax
law are more plausible than the conclusions that Hickman and Kerska
reach. Rather, the point is that the materials upon which Hickman and
Kerska rely are inconclusive. Neither the partisans for a broader reading
of the AIA nor the proponents of a narrower interpretation can claim that
the historical origins, statutory context, or subsequent developments in
administrative law and Tax Injunction Act jurisprudence confirm the
correctness of their position. At least as I see it, the debate over the
AIA’s proper scope ultimately turns on normative arguments that are
based on contemporary concerns and conditions. The AIA’s “lost
history” can inform this debate but cannot resolve it.
III. A MODERN ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
Against a present-day backdrop, the AIA stands out as peculiar in
several respects. First, the fears that seem to have motivated the statute’s
enactment appear outmoded today. In light of our modern pay-as-you-go
tax system as well as the United States’ access to deep and liquid capital
markets, it is hard to imagine any injunction seriously disrupting the

55
56

I.R.C. § 32 (2012).
Id. § 42.
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flow of federal revenue.57 And insofar as the law was intended to protect
individual local tax collectors from vexatious litigation,58 there is
something strange about using it to shield the IRS as a whole from suit.
Meanwhile, the statute sometimes dictates not merely the time and
forum of taxpayer challenges but whether such challenges will be
pursued at all. Consider the inversion-related regulations at issue in
Chamber of Commerce v. IRS.59 The special tax on domestic companies
leaving the country is sufficiently steep that the very possibility of
having to pay it will deter many firms from moving their legal domicile
abroad. The in terrorem effect of certain Treasury regulations may be so
great that the rules will remain immune from challenge unless they can
be contested in a pre-enforcement action. While the inversion
regulations strike me as an appropriate exercise of IRS authority, there is
certainly something disconcerting about the notion that the IRS could
issue legally defective rules and escape judicial oversight.
Yet even if the AIA has outlived its original purpose, and even if it
yields normatively unattractive consequences in certain circumstances,
the statute still serves at least two useful ends. First, it relieves some of
the immense pressure on the IRS’s already-strained regulatory
resources. As Hickman has argued elsewhere, temporary Treasury
regulations, IRS revenue rulings, and other guidance documents issued
by the IRS may be vulnerable to APA challenges on the grounds that
these pronouncements did not go through the notice-and-comment
process required for so-called “legislative rules.”60 Yet as Hickman also
acknowledges, broad application of the notice-and-comment
requirement to temporary Treasury regulations and other IRS
pronouncements would make it more difficult for the agency to respond
to taxpayers’ need for guidance and could at times be “ridiculously
wasteful.”61 And this is at a time when the IRS has precious few
resources to waste: the agency’s workforce is only two-thirds of what it

57

See Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962) (stating that
through the AIA, the federal government “is assured of prompt collection of its lawful
revenue”).
58
See id. at 7–8 (stating that a “collateral objective of the Act” is “protection of the
collector from litigation pending a suit for refund”).
59
26 C.F.R. § 1.7874-8T (2017).
60
Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 465, 492–502
(2013); see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (notice-and-comment requirement).
61
Hickman, supra note 60, at 531.
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was a quarter century ago,62 and the Trump administration’s most recent
budget proposes base funding for the agency that, in real terms, is down
by more than one-fifth since 2010.63 By delaying challenges to IRS
pronouncements, the AIA gives the agency additional time to complete
the notice-and-comment process for final rules while also allowing it
some flexibility in issuing temporary regulations and other stopgap
measures.
Second, and in a similar vein, the AIA protects the IRS from forum
shopping by plaintiffs who otherwise would seek a nationwide
injunction in the friendliest district court that they could find. Without
the AIA, sophisticated taxpayers and the interest groups that represent
them would enjoy a “general hunting license” to fire at the IRS in
different jurisdictions until one of their shots strikes flesh.64 This is not a
problem unique to the IRS: other commentators have noted that the
increasingly widespread use of nationwide injunctions poses a growing
challenge to administrative agencies of all sorts.65 But the fact that this
problem plagues other administrative agencies is not a reason to foist it
upon the IRS as well. Narrowing the AIA without also reining in the
practice of nationwide injunctions would make an already-significant
problem that much worse.66
Against these benefits must be weighed the cost of delaying a day in
court for taxpayers with valid grievances. But existing Supreme Court

62
Internal Revenue Serv., Internal Revenue Service Data Book 2016, at 66 tbl. 29 (2016),
https://perma.cc/48YA-VB47.
63
Compare Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal
Year 2019, at 90 (2018) (proposing an IRS budget of $11,100,000,000), with Office of
Mgmt. & Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2011, at 119 (2010)
(proposing an IRS budget of $12,147,000,000). The 2010 figure adjusted for inflation is
$13,894,000,000. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation
Calculator, https://perma.cc/W3DW-88ZF (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
64
Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n, 387 U.S. 167, 183 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part) (“[A]rming each of the federal district judges in this Nation with
power to enjoin enforcement of regulations and actions under . . . federal law . . . is a general
hunting license; and I respectfully submit, a license for mischief . . . .”).
65
For comprehensive treatments of the subject, see Samuel L. Bray, Multiple
Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 418–422 (2017);
Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 2095 (2017).
66
This is not to suggest that nationwide injunctions should be abolished altogether. But
even those who defend the practice under some circumstances acknowledge that district
courts should not use them in all circumstances. See Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman,
Response, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131 Harv. L. Rev. F. 49, 50–51
(2017).

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

86

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 104:74

case law construing the AIA ameliorates some of the statute’s more
draconian effects. The Supreme Court has held that the AIA applies
“only when Congress has provided an alternative avenue for an
aggrieved party to litigate its claims on its own behalf;”67 if there is no
way for a party to challenge an IRS determination in a later Tax Court
proceeding or refund suit, the party can seek a pre-enforcement remedy.
The Supreme Court also has carved out a limited exception allowing
pre-enforcement injunctions when the challenger can show that she
would suffer “irreparable injury” from a delay and that the IRS could not
possibly prevail on the merits.68 As noted above, this still deters some
taxpayers from challenging certain IRS positions indefinitely. For
example, a company is unlikely to undertake a merger so that it can
move its legal domicile overseas unless it can be sure that it will avoid
the special tax that is at issue in Chamber of Commerce.69 But in most
cases in which a taxpayer seeks a deduction or contests the inclusion of
an item in income, the statutory scheme ultimately allows her a judicial
hearing and the possibility of full relief.
To be sure, the AIA is a rather roundabout way of writing a statute to
achieve the goals I have laid out for it. A more direct approach would be
for Congress to (1) fund the IRS appropriately and (2) establish limits on
forum choice that mitigate the risk of nationwide injunction shopping.
The latter objective might be accomplished through a jurisdictional
statute that allows pre-enforcement challenges to Treasury regulations
exclusively in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, with
appeal to the D.C. Circuit. In contrast, a ban (with limited exceptions) on
equitable actions against the IRS appears to be overbroad.
Yet in our far-from-first-best world, with a woefully underfunded IRS
and few apparent limits on the ability of district courts to issue
nationwide injunctions, the notion of narrowing the AIA so as to allow
pre-enforcement judicial review of tax regulations seems to me like a
risky gambit. Better, in my view, for courts to defer to Congress and for
Congress to pair any amendment to the AIA with a boost in IRS funding
and a forum provision like the one described above. To whittle down the
AIA without simultaneously bolstering the IRS’s defenses would be to
expose the tax authority to an onslaught that could overwhelm it.
67

See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 381 (1984).
See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 737 (1974); Enochs v. Williams Packing
& Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
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See I.R.C. § 7874 (2012) (imposing tax on “inversion gain” of expatriated entities).
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There are commonalities between this argument and elements of
Hickman and Kerska’s case for a narrower AIA. Although their title
highlights their appeal to history, their analysis accounts for the more
recent evolution of the federal tax system. But while they emphasize the
expansiveness of the current Code, my focus is on the hollowed-out
agency that has been tasked with interpreting and administering our
tangle of tax statutes. To be sure, I cannot claim that my view of the
AIA as a shock-absorber for the IRS is deeply rooted in the statute’s
nineteenth-century history. But it is attentive to the reality of twentyfirst-century tax administration.
Where does that leave us as to the AIA’s reach? In my view, the
Supreme Court’s AIA case law supplies a serviceable test. First, a court
considering a pre-enforcement challenge to a federal tax would ask
whether the challenger would have a subsequent opportunity to litigate
the claim on her own behalf in the Tax Court or in a refund suit. If no,
the suit could proceed.70 If yes, the AIA would bar relief unless the
challenger could show both “irreparable injury” and “certainty of
success on the merits.”71 On this view, preemptive strikes against
Treasury regulations would in most cases fail. They would succeed only
when Congress has provided the challenger with no other avenue for
redress or when the IRS’s action is both indefensible and irremediable.
In sum, the flurry of regulatory activity that we are likely to see soon
from the IRS makes the question at the heart of Hickman and Kerska’s
article—whether the AIA bars pre-enforcement judicial review of tax
regulations—vitally important. But the same factor that makes their
analysis so relevant should also give us pause regarding the solution that
they propose—a solution that would place further stress on an IRS that
already appears to be buckling under the burden of the new tax law.72
Hopefully there will arrive a time in the not-too-distant future when
resource constraints are less binding and process values can be
vindicated. If at that point Congress revisits the statute, Hickman and
Kerska’s “engagement test” strikes me as a viable template for an
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See South Carolina, 465 U.S. at 381.
See Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 737.
See Editorial, Don’t Cheer as the I.R.S. Grows Weaker, N.Y. Times (Dec. 29, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/29/opinion/dont-cheer-as-the-irs-grows-weaker.html;
Jeanne Sahadi, IRS Needs More Money to Implement the New Tax Law, CNN Money (Jan.
10, 2018), https://perma.cc/6AQM-MMNJ.
71
72

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

88

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 104:74

updated AIA. Again, timing is everything. And the time for the
“engagement test” has yet to come.

